University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 7

Number 1

Article 13

1981

Evidentiary Privilege: Help for Corporations? The Supreme Court
Rejects the Control Group Test: Strengthens the Work-Product
Doctrine
Scott Selbach
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr

Recommended Citation
Selbach, Scott (1981) "Evidentiary Privilege: Help for Corporations? The Supreme Court Rejects the
Control Group Test: Strengthens the Work-Product Doctrine," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 7: No.
1, Article 13.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please
contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE: HELP FOR CORPORATIONS? THE SUPREME
COURT REJECTS THE CONTROL GROUP TEST: STRENGTHENS THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE-Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.

383 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege,' and its application to corporations,
has long been a source of confusion in the federal courts. 2 The
disorder stems from the competing interests arising between the liberal
scope of discovery and the secrecy important to the attorney-client
privilege.' The attorney-client privilege has been viewed as an exception to the general rule that the scope of discovery is to be liberally
construed in order to provide all parties with information essential to
proper litigation on all facts. 4 Even as an exception, however, the
1. The attorney-client privilege includes the broad ethical obligation of the attorney not to disclose the confidences of his client, as well as the evidentiary privilege
that arises in litigation. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate
Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAW 239, 241 (1981); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON No. 4 (1976); See generally Van Dusen, The Responsibility of
Lawyers: Advising Management Under the ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,
46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 565 (1974).
A much used definition of the attorney-client privilege is found in 8 J.WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.
Id.
2. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the FederalCourts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339 (1972). Note, United States v. Upjohn Co., The Sixth Circuit Adopts the Control Group Test, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 809
(1980); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: The Subject Matter Test v.
The Control Group Test: Will Reasonableness Prevail? United,States v. Upjohn, 5
DEL. J. CORP. L. 480 (1980); Note, The Privileged Few: United States v. Upjohn- What Is the Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege for a Corporation? 25
S.D.L. REv. 415 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The PrivilegedFew]; Note, Control Group
Test Adopted as Standardfor Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege by Corporate
Client-UnitedStates v. Upjohn Co., 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1041 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Control Group Test Adopted].
3. The underlying rationale of both the attorney-client privilege and the broad
scope of discovery is to promote the administration of justice. See United States v.
Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402
F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1968); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md.
1974); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 70; Note, Privileged Communications-Inroadson the "Control Group" Test in the CorporateArea, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 759 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Privileged Communications].
4. See Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79

Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 7:1

privilege has importance of its own in the dissemination of information.' Although confidential communications may be relevant, their
disclosure may impair the social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers for their clients.6 Only a fullyinformed lawyer can render effective legal advice. 7 Unless clients are
certain information they supply to their attorneys will not be
discovered and used against them, it is unlikely lawyers will receive full
information. 8
F.R.D. 72 (D. Puerto Rico 1978). In deference to the goals of liberal discovery, some
courts have attempted to limit the use of the attorney-client privilege. United States v.
Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
Wigmore has likewise attacked the attorney-client privilege.
[T]he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its benefits
are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. .

.

. It is

worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle
to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291 at 554.
The nondisclosure of information sought through discovery hinders the factfinding process. The PrivilegedFew, supra note 2, at 416; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 175 (2d ed. 1972).
5. See notes 3-4 supra. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege rests on the
attorney being fully informed. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); See
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976); United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977).
6. Comercio E Industria Continental, S.A., v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 19 F.R.D.
513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210 (1942).
7. See note 5 supra. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2290, at 543, 2291. In
Upjohn Justice Rehnquist espoused the idea that, "[The privilege's] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice." 449 U.S. at 389.
The Supreme Court also stated that the attorney-client privilege protects not only
information given to the client (those able to act on legal advice), but also information
given to the lawyer to enable him to give legal advice. Id. at 390. See also PitneyBowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (privilege extends to communications from attorney to client as well as from client to attorney).
Other rationales for protecting the attorney-client privilege include:
1. The notion that increased disclosure between attorney and client increases
assurance that the law is being complied with. See The PrivilegedFew, supra note 2, at
416; 449 U.S. at 392. The Court discussed this rationale's particular applicability to
corporations who, unlike most individuals, must frequently consult attorneys about
complex business transactions in order to ensure that those activities are within the
bounds of the law.
2. The notion that, because the relationship between attorney and client is one
of privacy, fears that communications might be revealed would hinder the administration of justice. 449 U.S. at 389.
8. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 87, at 175; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§
2290, at 543, 2291, at 545; The Privileged Few, supra note 2, at 415-16.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13
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Another recognized exception to the broad scope of discovery is
the work-product doctrine. 9 Absent an adverse party's substantial need
for materials in preparation of his case, the doctrine protects against
disclosure of any memoranda, notes, or working papers created by an
attorney in anticipation of litigation. In addition, an attorney need not
reveal his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
concerning the litigation.' 0 The work-product doctrine is based
primarily on the right of a lawyer to enjoy privacy while preparing a
case for litigation." While still an important function in the fair-administration of justice, the work-product doctrine, like the attorney2
client privilege, runs head on against the goals of liberal discovery.'
FACTS AND DECISION
3
The Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, addressing
the battle between the goals of liberal discovery and the exceptions

9. The work-product doctrine, which was first articulated in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947), is now codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The rule provides in
pertinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering the discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
While the work-product doctrine is similarly supported by the rationales of
privacy and administration of justice, it is distinct from and broader than the attorneyclient privilege. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973); Privileged Communications, supra note
3, at 30. The attorney-client privilege is a privilege owned by the client, which may be
invoked by the attorney or the client. The work-product doctrine is a privilege of the
attorney and may be invoked only by the attorney.
Information that may not be privileged from discovery under the attorney-client
privilege may still be exempt under the work-product doctrine. 449 U.S. at 401. The
work-product doctrine principally protects mental processes of the attorney, providing
a privileged area within which to analyze and prepare a client's case. United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
10. FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(3).
11. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); United
States v. 38 Cases, More or Less, 35 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
12. See notes 3-5 supra.
13. 449 U.S. 383 (1981), rev'g in part, United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
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thereto," held that under certain circumstances communications between corporate attorneys and corporate employees made pursuant to
an internal corporate investigation are protected from disclosure to the
Internal Revenue Service." The Court also made clear that the workproduct doctrine is applicable to Internal Revenue Service summonses. II
In Upjohn, the petitioner' 7 was informed by its independent accountants that one of the company's foreign subsidiaries had made
payments directly or indirectly to foreign government officials,
presumably to enhance business opportunities abroad.' 8 Upjohn began
14. See notes 1-7 supra.
15. 449 U.S. at 383.
16. Under I.R.C. § 7602, the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) may summon a
person to produce for I.R.S. examination any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material to an I.R.S. inquiry into the correctness of a tax
return. If the person summoned under § 7602 neglects or refuses to obey the summons,
the United States District Court for the district in which the person resides or is found,
has jurisdiction to compel compliance with the summons and order an attachment for
contempt if the summons is not obeyed. I.R.C. § 7604.
The principal issues in Upjohn revolved around the company's refusal to comply
with an I.R.S. summons which demanded production of
[a]ll files relative to the investigation conducted under supervision of Gerard
Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign governments and any
political contributions made by the Upjohn Company or any of its affiliates since
January 1, 1971 and to determine whether any funds of the Upjohn Company had
been improperly accounted for on the corporate books during the same period.
The records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to
managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes
of the interviews conducted in the United States and abroad with officers and
employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries.
449 U.S. at 387-88.
The company felt that the information demanded in the second part was guarded
from disclosure by both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the work-product issue cursory treatment by
footnoting that the work-product doctrine did not apply to an I.R.S. summons under
§ 7602. 600 F.2d 1228 n. 13. The Supreme Court, however, dissatisfied with the lower
court's loose, conclusory language, took up the issue in detail. The Court investigated
the legislative history of the I.R.S. provisions, read the plain meaning of the statutes,
and cited case law to support its conclusion that the work-product doctrine indeed is
applicable to a tax summons. 449 U.S. at 398-99.
17. The Upjohn Company is a worldwide producer and distributor of pharmaceuticals. Mr. P.T. Parfet Jr. is the company's Chairman of the Board. Mr. Gerard
Thomas is Upjohn's Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel.
18. The payments of approximately $4,400,000 were first discovered while Upjohn's independent accountants were auditing the books of the foreign subsidiary. The
company voluntarily provided the I.R.S. with limited information which ultimately
prompted the I.R.S. to conduct an audit of Upjohn's 1972-73 consolidated federal income tax return. Upjohn also disclosed details of the questionable payments to the
Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K in hopes of receiving lenient treatment by the SEC. 600 F.2d'at 1225. For a thorough discussion of the SEC Voluntary
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13
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an internal investigation of the payments by preparing and distributing
a letter containing a questionnaire to all foreign and general area
managers, seeking detailed information concerning the payments. 9
The managers were informed that the purpose of the questionnaire was
to gain full information regarding the nature and magnitude of any
payments.2 0 Managers were also aware that the investigation was
highly confidential and was not to be discussed with anyone other than
those Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing information.I'
After discovering information regarding Upjohn's questionable
payments, the Internal Revenue Service demanded production of the
questionnaires and counsel's notes on the interviews to determine the
effect of any such payments on Upjohn's tax liability. 2" Upjohn refused to comply with the I.R.S. demand, asserting protection by the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.23
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan enforced the summons for documents. The decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 4 The court of appeals adopted the "control group"
test as the standard for determining the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context. While it recognized that the
attorney-client privilege is applicable to corporations," the sixth circuit
Disclosure Program, see Note, Discovery of Internal Corporate Investigations, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1166-68 (1980).
19. 449 U.S. at 386-87. The decision to investigate the payments was a result of
consultation among Upjohn's Chairman, its General Counsel, and outside counsel.
The letter and questionnaires were prepared by Upjohn's in-house counsel. Upjohn's
General Counsel interviewed recipients of the questionnaires and other Upjohn
employees. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. See note 16 supra.
23. 449 U.S. at 388. See notes 9 & 16 supra. Upjohn did provide the I.R.S. with a
list of employees who had communicated with the General Counsel and outside
counsel. The I.R.S. subsequently interviewed 25 persons named on the list. 449 U.S. at

396.
24. 600 F.2d at 1227-28.
25. Id. at 1226. Courts and authors have repeatedly assumed that the attorneyclient privilege applies to corporations. United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.,
236 U.S. 318 (1915); Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18
F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass 1950); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209(a) (1942); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 503(b)[04], at 41 (1981); Comment, The Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege to the Corporation, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1970); Comment, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client
Published by eCommons, 1981
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found that the communications made between in-house counsel and
the company's subordinate corporate agents and employees were not
protected by the privilege for the simple reason that the communications were not the "client's." 26
The United States Supreme Court rejected the control group test as
the standard of applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations, remanding the case for further proceedings on Upjohn's workproduct claim."
ANALYSIS

Despite conflict in the federal courts and considerable prompting
from commentators," the Supreme Court set no clear standard for
future cases applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations. Instead, the Court rejected the control group test; drafted narrow standards applicable solely to the Upjohn facts; and stressed the workproduct doctrine as additional and alternative support for its
decision.2
Privilege to a Corporation-The Current Evolution of an "Accepted" Rule of Law, 17
U. MIAMI L. REV. 382 (1963).
The first case to squarely address the issue was Radiant Burners v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The court
reversed the district court's ruling that the privilege did not apply to a corporate client.
Id. at 324. The court also footnoted a lengthy list of cases to support its holding that
the attorney-client privilege is appurtenant to the corporation. Id. at 319-20 n.7. For
expansive commentary on the district court's decision in Radiant Burners, see Note,
Corporations-Attorney-Client Privilege-Nonavailability of the Privilege to Corporations, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 416 (1963); Note, Evidence: Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 48 CORNELL L.Q.
551 (1963); Note, Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client-A Corporation
May Not Invoke the Attorney-Client Privilege, 76 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1963); Note,
Attorney-Client Privileges: Application To A Corporate Client, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 551
(1963); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege Held Not Available to Corporations, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 955 (1962).
Although the applicability of the privilege to corporations is well settled, confusion
still exists on the crucial question who qualifies as the corporate client. See Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege-Identifying the Corporate Client, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
1281 (1980); Kobak, supra note 2; Privileged Communications, supra note 3.
26. 600 F.2d at 1225. The court reasoned that since corporations are inanimate,
artificial entities, employees involved with compartmentalized responsibilities do not
represent the entire corporation. The opinion by Judge Merritt stated, "[it is only the
senior management, guiding and integrating the several operations, which can be said
to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole." Id. at 1226.
27. 449 U.S. at 402.
28. For articles generally critical of the control group test and in favor of developing a standard for future cases, see Note, Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
to Corporations: New Directions and a Proposed Solution, 20 B.C.L. REV. 953 (1979);
See also note 2 supra.
29. 449 U.S. at 386.
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A. Rejection of the Control Group Test
The Supreme Court viewed its problem as one of deciding if and
how to apply the attorney-client privilege to the facts before it in order
to be consistent with the purpose of the privilege.3" Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, viewed the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege as the encouragement of full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients, thereby promoting broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.3 1 The
majority justified each of its objections to the control group test on the
basis that the test did not foster the purpose and policies of the
attorney-client privilege, as the Court saw them.
The Court first refused to apply the control group test originally
articulated in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp." The
control group test limits the number of employees who may claim the
attorney-client privilege on behalf of the corporation. The City of
Philadelphiacourt extended the privilege to an employee only
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be,
is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has
that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when
3
he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
The control group test is intended to limit exceptions to the broad
scope of discovery.38 Fears that needed information would be made
privileged by funneling it through corporate attorneys led to increased
support of the control group test. Courts advocating the test believed a
broad "zone of silence" would be created if the attorney-client
30. Id. at 389.
31. Id. See note 7 supra.
32. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub
nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 943 (1963).
33. 210 F. Supp. at 485. Other cases adopting the control group test include: Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26
(D. Md. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
A much cited commentary regarding the control group test is Note, AttorneyClient Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients].
34. See note 3 supra. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir.
1979); Comment, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to
Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 288, 300 (1972).
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privilege were extended beyond control group members. 5 Reiterating
misgivings about restricting the scope of discovery, the sixth circuit in
Upjohn held that only communications made by top management to
the corporation's attorney, which otherwise met the requirements of
the attorney-client privilege, would be protected from disclosure.3 6
Unlike an individual client, who alone provides information to his
lawyer and then acts upon advice returned, the corporate client includes middle and lower level employees who necessarily possess information needed by the corporation's lawyers but at the same time are
not responsible for acting on the attorney's advice. 7 The Upjohn
Court aptly pointed out that advocates of the control group test, by
limiting protected communications to those made between lawyers and
persons in control, embrace only half of the purpose of the attorneyclient privilege. The advocates' approach fails to distinguish clients'
dual roles as providers of information and actors on returned advice."
The majority criticized this approach in light of the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege. "Such a view, we think, overlooks the fact
that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional
advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to
the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice."31 9 The
modern corporation is structured in a way that places middle and
lower level employees in a position to obtain relevant information
needed by corporate counsel."0 Even though the lower-echelon
employees are not normally responsible for acting upon advice given
by corporate attorneys, it is vital that information they possess be communicated to counsel."'
35. 600 F.2d at 1227. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 953, 955 (1956). Simon's article first voiced the "zone of
silence" phrase. Simon asserted that corporations with their large number of agents,
masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers have a greater ability to insulate and hide many of their activities by discussing them with legal advisers. Thus, a
"zone of silence" is created over corporate activities.
36. 600 F.2d at 1226.
37. 449 U.S. at 391.
38. Id. See Control Group Test Adopted, supra note 2, at 1051.
39. 449 U.S. at 390.
40. In commentary written before the Upjohn decision, authors recognized that
modem corporations and their structures are complex mazes, with high level management relying daily on information supplied by employees not members of a control
group. See, e.g., Note, Corporations-Attorney-Client Privilege-The AttorneyClient Privilege Is Applicable to a Corporate Employee's Communication if the
Employee Makes it at the Direction of His Superior to Secure Legal Advice for the
Corporation, if the Subject Matter Is Within the Scope of the Employee's Corporate
Duties, and if its ContentsAre Not DisseminatedBeyond Persons Who Need to Know
Them, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 413, 424 (1979).
41. The Supreme Court pointed out that in some instances lower level employees
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13
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Adoption of the control group test would give an attorney dealing
with a complex legal problem a "Hobson's choice."11 2 If a corporate
attorney chose not to seek information from non-control group
members in order to preserve application of the attorney-client
privilege, he or she would run the high risk of not being fully informed
of relevant facts. If the attorney decided to interview lower level
employees in order to obtain information, fears that such information,
now discoverable through loss of the attorney-client privilege, would
be subsequently used against the supplying employee could restrict full
and frank communication. Thus, the very purpose of the attorneyclient privilege would be thwarted. The consequences of this misguided
approach can be seen in the example of a truck driver for a large corporation. If he is involved in an accident for which the company may
be liable, he could well be the only one able to tell the corporate attorney what happened. Since the driver is not a member of the control
group, corporate counsel could be compelled to disclose to the opposing party what the driver said regarding the accident. 3 Such a result
would surely undermine the very nature of the attorney-client
privilege.
The Supreme Court also based its rejection of the control group
test on the test's adverse effect on the corporate lawyer's role as part
of the managing team of the corporation. The corporate lawyer not
only formulates advice when the client is faced with a specific legal
problem, but also supplies and seeks day-to-day information to ensure
corporate compliance with the law. The attorney's task is a formidable
one in light of the complex regulatory laws facing modern corporations
today." If corporate attorneys are stymied in their efforts to become
fully informed, their valuable efforts and contributions as part of corporate management threaten to become limited."'
While on its face the control group test would appear to lead to
predictable results, in practice it is difficult to apply.' 6 The test limits
protection of the attorney-client privilege to those who play a substanmay be responsible for acting upon legal advice rendered. 449 U.S. at 392. This observation strengthens rejection of the control group test because both purposes of the
attorney-client privilege are satisfied by lower level employees. See Duplan Corp., v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974).
42. 449 U.S. at 391-92 (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1977)).
43. Stem, Attorney-Client Privilege: Supreme Court Repudiates the Control
Group Test, 67 A.B.A.J. 1142, 1143 (1981).
44. 449 U.S. at 392.
45. Id. See also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164
(D.S.C. 1974); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
46. 449 U.S. at 393.
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tial role in deciding a corporation's response to legal advice.4 It is not
always clear who fits within this category, making the control group
test an uncertain privilege. The purpose of full and frank communication cannot be served if the attorney and client cannot predict with
some degree of certainty what discussions will be protected."8 This
problem with the control group test was pointed out by the majority
which stressed that any standard applied must serve the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege.4 9
The Supreme Court also refused to adopt the broader "subject
matter" test in its Upjohn decision."0 The subject matter test was set
forth by the seventh circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker,II and modified by the eighth circuit in Diversified Indus., Inc.
47. Id. See note 33 supra.
48. Compare, e.g., Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D. Olka. 1967),
aff'd in part sub noma. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (control group
includes managers and assistant managers of patent division and research and development department) with Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85
(E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (control group includes only division and corporate vice presidents, and not two directors of research and vice president
of production and research). 449 U.S. at 393.
49. 449 U.S. at 393.
50. Id. at 386. Although the Court focused its attention on refuting the control
group test, it is important to understand the subject matter test because the guidelines
set forth in the Upjohn holding resemble the standards in the subject matter test.
51. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971). Justice Douglas took no part in the affirming decision.
The plaintiffs, consisting of state and local governments, public schools, and public
libraries, filed antitrust actions against various publishers and wholesalers of children's
library books for alleged conspiracies to inflate prices. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, finding that the attorney-client privilege did
not prevent discovery, permitted the plaintiffs to inspect and copy certain memoranda,
all but one of which were prepared by company attorneys during interviews of
employees shortly after they had testified before a federal grand jury. The United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued a writ of mandamus compelling the
lower court to vacate its order. The subject matter test was initiated in the court's conclusion.
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the
direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon
which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.
423 F.2d at 491-92.
For an expanded discussion of Harper& Row, see Note, Attorney-Client Privilege
for Corporate Clients, supra note 33; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360 (1970); PrivilegedCommunications, supra note 3; The Privileged Few, supra note 2.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the law when it granted certiorari
to hear the Harper & Row case. Instead, however, the Court foreshadowed its reluctance to set down a specific test for future cases by affirming the Harper& Row decihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13
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v. Meredith." The subject matter test provides a privilege of nondisclosure for communications between an employee and corporate
counsel when that employee possesses employment related information
siori without opinion. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the AttorneyClient Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1971); Note, Civil
Procedure-Attorney-Client Privilege-Privilege Protects Communications Made by
Corporate Employee To Secure Legal Advice and a Matter Committed to a Professional Legal Advisor Is Prima Facie Committed To Secure Legal Advice, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 667, 672 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Civil Procedure].
52. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). The corporate defendant, Diversified Industries
Inc., sought to protect from discovery the contents of a certain memorandum and
report prepared for its benefit by outside counsel. The defendant was sued in the
district court for unlawful conspiracy. The plaintiff, Weatherhead Company, allegedly
was paid large sums of money out of Diversified's "slush fund" to procure the purchase from Diversified by Weatherhead of large amounts of inferior copper. 572 F.2d
at 600. The memorandum was a full and detailed report of Diversified's internal investigations into the payments. It identified persons who had been interviewed and set
out the substance of what they had said. It discussed persons who did not give information, mentioning instructions given to employees demanding their cooperation with
the law firm. 572 F.2d at 601. On hearing en banc, Judge Heaney announced that, subject to certain restrictions, the Harper & Row subject matter test was the proper standard by which to measure the scope of a corporation's attorney-client privilege. The
modified subject matter test adds stipulations which narrow the application of the test.
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (1)
the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the
employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents.
572 F.2d at 609.
For detailed commentary on the Diversified decision see Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc., v. Meredith: New Rules for Applying the
Privilege When the Client Is a Corporation, 57 N.C. L. REV. 306 (1979) (test balances
the narrowness of the control group test with the expansiveness of the Harper & Row
decision); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-A Compromise Solution,
11 CONN. L. REV. 94 (1978) (modified test provides a middle ground between the
criticisms of the control group test and the Harper & Row decision); Note, Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: The Modified
Harper & Row Test, 4 J. CORP. L. 226 (1978) (new test curbs Harper & Row's potential for abuse and still allows for a greater degree of privilege than does the control
group test).
Although the Harper & Row and Diversified decisions have been discussed as having similar sum and substance, the Diversified test stands for the position of better protecting the purpose underlying the attorney-client privilege. The largest potential for
abuse in the Harper & Row test is the corporation's ability to funnel most corporate
communications through attorneys in order to prevent discovery. 572 F.2d at 609.
Under the Diversified test, the receipt of ordinary business reports by the company's
attorneys would not be sufficient to invoke the privilege. The added stipulations requiring that the communications be made for the purpose of securing legal advice and
not be disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure,
need to know their contents, would not be met. Supra note 50.
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acquired in the ordinary course of business and when the employee
confidentially disseminates the information to corporate counsel in
order to assist the attorney in giving legal advice to the corporation."
The subject matter test offers a wider and more practical reach for the
attorney-client privilege and is not based on the rank or status of a particular employee. The Court refused, however, to base its decision on a
choice between the control group and subject matter tests. Significantly, the Court did not quiet the conflict among the circuit courts
debating the choice before the Upjohn decision."4
B. Adoption of a Narrow Standard
The Upjohn decision supplies corporations conducting internal investigations of possible wrongdoing with some guidelines on how to
conduct such procedures in order to ensure protection by the attorneyclient privilege." The Upjohn Court was willing to define a "test" to
serve corporate attorneys advising their clients in at least this narrow
area of the law. Although the Court did not articulate a standard to
govern all cases, by holding that the communications at issue were
privileged, it aligned itself with the modified subject matter test of the
eighth circuit in Diversified.6
The majority noted that the communications at issue were made by
Upjohn employees to corporate counsel to aid in formulating legal advice." The communications were made at the direction of corporate
superiors. 8 The communications concerned subject matter within the
scope of the employees' duties and were considered "highly confidential" when made. 9 By stressing these factors, the Court had essentially
applied the elements of the modified subject matter test to the Upjohn
facts.
53. 600 F.2d at 1226.
54. The District Courts of the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, and the Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits adopted the
subject matter test. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit firmly adopted the
control group test, as did the Sixth Circuit. See Control Group Test Adopted, supra
note 2, at 1048.
55. Recently, there has been a sharp rise in the number of companies retaining
special counsel to investigate internal corporate wrongdoing. Brodsky, The "Zone of
Darkness": Special Counsel Investigations and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEC.
REG. L. J. 123 (1980). See also SEC v. Citizens & S. Realty Investors, 450 SEC. REG. &
L. REP.A-15 (BNA 1978); SEC v. IU Int'l Corp., 450 SEC. REG. &L. REP. A-15 (BNA

1978).
56. See note 52 supra. Feld, Supreme Court in Upjohn Protects Attorney-Client
Privilege; Upholds the Work-Product Doctrine, 54 J. TAX. 210, 212 (1981).

57. 449 U.S. at 394.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 395.
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In addition to the elements of the modified subject matter test, the
Court added two factors of its own that it considered important to the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege in the Upjohn decision.
First, the Court emphasized that the information needed by counsel,
which would supply the basis for legal advice, was not available from
upper-echelon management.6 0 Second, it noted that the employees
were aware they were being questioned in order that the corporation
could obtain legal advice. 6' 1 Adoption of these factors indicates the
Court's awareness of the complex functioning of a modern corporation.
Although the Court identified elements for determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations, the Upjohn
decision nevertheless represents a narrow holding.6 2 Except in the
limited context of investigating internal wrongdoing, no new standards
were set nor old tests clarified. In fact, the Supreme Court has furthered confusion in federal courts by simply adding elements to a preexisting test.6 3 While rejecting the control group test as too narrow, the
Court used the facts before it to tighten up the modified subject matter
test in order to calm the fears of a large "zone of silence."" Consequently, the degree of predictability essential to the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is still lacking. Corporate counsel are aware of
the factors applicable to the Upjohn facts as stated by the Supreme
Court, but are unaware of-the impact or importance of these factors in
subsequent investigations.
The Court's failure to provide more guidance spurred a concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger.6 ' In deference to the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege and the duty of the Court to provide guidance,
the Chief Justice would have articulated a standard to govern similar
cases. Chief Justice Burger's general rule would have read,
[A] communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or
former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of
60. Id. at 394.
61. Id. The questionnaire clearly indicated the legal implications of the interviews.
A statement attached to the questionnaire indicated that "all payments must be proper
and legal." The statement began, "Upjohn will comply with all laws and regulations,"
and continued by saying that commissions or payments would "not be used as a
subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments." Id. at 395.
62. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
63. But see Feld, supra note 56, at 213 (Court's refusal to adopt a particular test
may be an implicit invitation to the lower federal courts to broaden the scope of the
privilege).
64. See Simon, supra note'35, at 955.
65. See note 70 infra.
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employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the management to
inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel
in performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the
employee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be taken by
others with regard to that conduct."'
While the Chief Justice's standard would solidify the guidelines
drafted by the majority, it would still leave important questions
unanswered regarding the weight to be accorded the various factors
relied upon by the Upjohn majority.
The fact that the communications were made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and were considered "highly confidential" are
both important in serving the purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
These requirements ensure full and frank communication between
client and counsel. Thus limited, the privilege protects only communications intended to be confidential,"7 and in the corporate context
negates the temptation of corporate management to funnel all information through its attorneys in order to avoid disclosure." The fact
that the communications in Upjohn concerned matters within the
scope of the employees' duties is important in light of the competing
interests between the attorney-client privilege and broad discovery.
This criterion denies the use of the privilege to an employee who was
merely a witness to an event. 9 It is, therefore, another means of blocking corporate misuse of the attorney-client privilege, properly limiting
use of the privilege to situations in which its goals are served. Based on
the privilege's traditional status as an exception to broad discovery,
these factors mentioned by the Court are necessary elements for the
application of the attorney-client privilege to corporate investigations
and should continue to be so in future cases.
The Upjohn Court's requirement that communications be made at
the direction of corporate superiors seems valid on its face as a device
to protect broad discovery. In practice, however, the requirement
overlooks the fact that modern, complex corporations operate in large
part by the decision making of middle and lower level employees. This
requirement competes with the Court's awareness of the managerial
functioning of a large corporation. Furthermore, the Court did not
66. 449 U.S. at 403.
67. IBM Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (D. Del. 1968). See The
Privileged Few, supra note 2, at 426.
68. The Privileged Few, supra note 2, at 426; Civil Procedure, supra note 51, at
679.
69. Id.
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mention what level of corporate management could direct communications between an employee and corporate counsel. Thus, on this particular requirement, corporate counsel and federal courts are faced
with the same bewilderment that the control group test presented to
them. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Burger's discussion of the requirements in his concurrence also fails to clarify the reasons or need
for corporate management's authorization of communications between employee and lawyer. 0
The new factors added by the Court in Upjohn are also unclear for
corporate counsel relying on the decision. The Court's emphasizing
that upper-echelon management did not possess the information needed to supply a basis for receiving legal advice again indicates its
awareness of the functions of the modern corporation. The Court's examination of this issue is, however, "unduly formalistic."" The opinion does not make clear whether this factor is a prerequisite to the application of the privilege or merely an observation made by the Court
based on the case at bar. The Court also noted that the Upjohn
employees were aware they were being questioned in order that the
corporation could obtain legal advice.'" While this fact received extensive commentary from Justice Rehnquist," its relationship to enhancing the goals of the attorney-client privilege is murky. It is arguable
that full and frank communication is hampered when corporate
employees are made aware that their responses to management's questions carry potential legal consequences." Determining the degree of
importance placed upon this factor will be a major difficulty in application of the privilege. If employee knowledge is indispensable to
the privilege's application nearly all communications between corporate counsel and employees will be less than candid. While it is more
70. 449 U.S. at 403. Rejecting the control group test applied by the court of appeals, Justice Rehnquist commented, "We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of
rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do
so." Id. at 386. Justice Rehnquist's refusal to lay down a test to decide the question
with mathematical precision conflicts with his desire to articulate a certain privilege to
enable the attorney and client to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. Id. at 393.
In his concurring opinion, which noted the majority's discrepancy, Chief Justice
Burger advocated development of a standard that would govern similar cases and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and the federal courts. Id. at
402.
71. Feld, supra note 56, at 212. In establishing several other factors in the decision, the Court was sensitive to the fact that the modern corporation is not run in all
respects from the boardroom.
72. 449 U.S. at 394.
73. See note 61 supra.
74. See note 8 supra.
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evident to the employee that an internal corporate investigation may
involve legal ramifications, the Court did not indicate whether the
privilege would protect communications between attorney and
employee when the consequences of a response are undetermined.
C. Work-Product Doctrine Found Applicable to I.R.S. Summonses
Once the Supreme Court rejected the control group test and found
that the communications by the Upjohn employees to corporate
counsel were covered by the attorney-client privilege, a decision had to
be reached regarding Upjohn's contention that its notes and memoranda
of the interviews were protected by the work-product doctrine. 7 The
Court found that any material subject to the summons which was not
protected by the attorney-client privilege fell under the cloak of the work76
product doctrine and therefore gained protection from disclosure.
As with the attorney-client privilege, the claim of work-product
privilege is not affected by the client being a corporation. 77 The work8 cannot propproduct doctrine first announced in Hickman v. Taylor"
erly be described as a privilege. It is simply a requirement that cause be
shown if disclosure is to be made of materials created in the course of a
lawyer's preparation of a case. 9 In practical effect, however, the
work-product doctrine serves as an alternative means of protection
from compelled disclosure. When adopting the doctrine, the Hickman
Court recognized a qualified protection from disclosure of an attorney's written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections prepared in anticipation of litigation. 0 The Hickman Court's rationale is summed up in Justice Murphy's opinion.
75. 449 U.S. at 397. See note 9 supra.
76. 449 U.S. at 401. The work-product issue arose principally through Upjohn's
assertion that its notes and memoranda of interviews contained more than mere
answers to questions. Upjohn sought this alternative means of avoiding disclosure
because the attorney-client privilege protects only against disclosure of communications. Additionally, seven of the 86 employees interviewed by Upjohn's counsel had
terminated their employment with Upjohn at the time of the interview. While neither
the district court, court of appeals, nor Supreme Court addressed the issue whether
communications between corporate counsel and ex-employees are privileged, if they
are not, the work-product doctrine may provide a means of preventing discovery. Id.
at 394 n.3.
77. Duffy v. United States, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); Radiant Burners Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
78. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See note 9 supra.
79. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962), mandamus andprohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). See note 9 supra.
80. 329 U.S. at 510; Miller, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work ProductDoctrine:Protectionfrom Compelled Disclosure in Criminal Investigation of a Corporation, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 569, 592 (1978).
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Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for
the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift
what he considers to be relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice
and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs and countless other tangible and intangible
ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in
this case as the "work-product of the lawyer." Were such materials open
to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing, and the interest of the client and the cause of justice would
be poorly served. 8 '
Implementation of the work-product doctrine invokes a battle between
discovery and non-disclosure similar to that which occurs in applying
the attorney-client privilege.8 2 The quest for a certain degree of privacy
for lawyers often competes with the desire for broad discovery, even
though the common end of both is to serve thd cause of justice.
The Government in Upjohn, attacking the company's assertion of
work-product protection, chose not to rely on the sixth circuit's decision that the doctrine did not apply to I.R.S. summonses. Faced with
an array of adverse legislative history, past court decisions, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Government was aware that its
argument would be scant on any of these bases.83 Instead, the Govern81. 329 U.S. at 510-11.
82. See notes 1-7 supra.
83. "The Government concedes, wisely, that the Court of Appeals erred and that
the work-product doctrine does apply to IRS summonses." 449 U.S. at 397. "Nothing
in the language of the IRS summons provisions or their legislative history suggests an
intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the work-product doctrine."
Id. at 398. See also note 16 supra.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) provides, inter alia,
These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production
of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the
United States under any statute of the United States except as otherwise provided
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ment based its argument for requiring production on the magistrate's
decision that it had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome
the doctrine's protection." ' The Hickman decision left open the opportunity for discovery of written materials obtained or prepared by
adversary's counsel. Without the possibility of overcoming the doctrine on a showing of necessity, the Hickman Court felt that the liberal
ideals of deposition and discovery would be stripped of much of their
meaning." Relevant and nonprivileged facts that remain hidden in an
opposing attorney's file that are essential to the preparation of a case
may be discoverable. 86 Requiring production may also be proper where
witnesses are no longer available or may be reached only with difficulty.8 7 Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) mandates that
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means, discovery of documents and tangible things
prepared in anticipation of litigation may be had.8 8 The Government
attempted to use the "substantial need" and "without undue hardship" standard by maintaining that the Upjohn interviewees were scattered across the globe and that Upjohn had forbidden its employees to
answer questions it considered irrelevant.8 9
Most important, the Hickman decision based the work-product exception on written materials. What the Government failed to discern
was that the statements written by Upjohn's counsel on the questionnaires were oral statements in the form of memoranda and therefore
by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in the proceedings.
But see United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967) (the relevancy of the
work-product doctrine to a proceeding for the enforcement of a summons issued by
the Commissioner of the I.R.S. may well be doubted).
84. 449 U.S. at 399.
85. 329 U.S. at 511-12.
86. Id. at 511.
87. Id.
88. See note 9 supra. A 1970 amendment to rule 34 eliminated some confusion
caused by having two distinct requirements of justification. Prior to the amendment,
rule 34 required a showing of "good cause" in order for a moving party to demand
discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, copying, or
photographing. On the other hand, rule 26 required a showing of "substantial need"
and "without undue hardship" in order to obtain trial preparation materials. The
"good cause" requirement was eliminated because of the erratic and uncertain protection it provided to the parties from whom production was sought, and replaced by the
more specific provisions of rule 26 relating to materials prepared for trial. See Explanatory Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendments to Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487
(1970).
89. 449 U.S. at 399.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/13

19811

NOTES

did not fall within the often quoted exception to the Hickman protection. 90 The Hickman Court's concern for strictly protecting attorneys'
mental processes is carried over into rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 9 ' Despite the exceptions in rule 26, no showing of
relevance, substantial need, or undue hardship will justify compelled
disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories. 92 "Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to
repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver the
account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such production." 93
The main source of uncertainty in reconciling the Hickman decision with rule 26 stems from the rule's failure to clarify whether oral
statements fall into the first part of rule 26(b)(3), which would make
them subject to the "substantial need" and "without undue hardship"
standard. Some courts have steadfastly kept oral statements out of the
first half of rule 26(b)(3) and concluded that no showing of necessity
can overcome work-product protection based on oral statements. In
Duffy v. United States,9' an attorney for the Northern Gas Company
was ordered by the' district court to answer Grand Jury questions
which would have required revelation of information received from informants and was also ordered to bring all notes, memoranda, or other
records of all such contacts. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the attorney's conviction for civil contempt, basing its decision on the absolute, rather than conditional protection of the workproduct doctrine. 9 In In re Grand Jury Investigation,9 ' an attorney
representing a bank refused to produce documents subpoened during a
Grand Jury investigation into criminally false statements in bank
customers' loan applications. The investigation centered on the
possibility that certain bank officers had knowingly concealed that in90. Upjohn's General Counsel described his notes of the interviews as containing
what I considered to be the important questions, the substance of the responses to
them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they related
to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other questions. In some instances they might even suggest other questions that I would have to ask or things
that I needed to find elsewhere.
449 U.S. 400 n.8.
91. See note 9 supra.
92. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
93. 329 U.S. at 512-13.
94. 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
95. Id.
96. 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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formation from responsible authorities." The court held the attorney's
notes of conversations were absolutely protected from disclosure."
The Supreme Court in Upjohn noted that courts declining to adopt
this absolute rule have nonetheless recognized that such material is entitled to special protection."
The Supreme Court in Upjohn did not decide the issue, but instead
rejected the magistrate's conclusion simply because he incorrectly
assumed oral statements could be denied work-product protection
based on the standards of rule 26(b)(3).'0 A closer analysis of Justice
Rehnquist's language, however, unveils the conclusion that oral
statements, at least in the form of notes and memoranda in response to
internal investigations, represent the mental processes of the attorney
and, therefore, are not discoverable under any circumstances. "The
notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are
work-product based on oral statements ... they reveal the attorneys'
mental processes in evaluating the communications." 101
By concluding that the magistrate applied the wrong standard in
Upjohn's work-product claim, the Court strengthened the doctrine at
the expense of liberal discovery. The opinion leaves no doubt that the
work-product doctrine is applicable to an I.R.S. summons enforcement proceeding. The work-product decision also dampens the
I.R.S.'s hopes foroa more convenient and open means of investigating
possible corporate wrongdoing, placing the privilege at least on equal
footing with liberal discovery. 0 2
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's efforts in Upjohn to strike a balance between
liberal discovery and the privileges that serve as exceptions thereto
have resulted in three conclusions. First, and most important, the control group test has clearly been refuted as the basis for applying the
attorney-client privilege to corporate communications. Second, cor97. Id. at 945.
98. Id. at 949.
99. 449 U.S. at 401; See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224,
1231 (3d Cir. 1979); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2nd Cir. 1979)
(notes and memoranda based on oral interviews may be discovered only upon a high
degree of necessity).
100. 449 U.S. at 401. Rule 26 hints that oral statements are not subject to discovery
under the first part of 26(b)(3), but the language is less than clear. "[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things .. ." (emphasis added).
101. 449 U.S. at 401.
102. See Feld, supra note 56, at 213 n.13. Several attempts have been made to
formulate reasons to justify discovery of counsel's work product. For the most part,
the reasons have failed to accomplish discovery.
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porate counsel conducting internal investigations are supplied with
guidelines as to what factors will be considered when communications
between counsel and corporate employees are protected from
disclosure. Third, the Court made plain that the work-product doctrine does apply to I.R.S. summonses, and reaffirmed that more than
traditional Hickman necessity must be shown in order to justify
disclosure of oral statements.
Beyond the clear conclusions written, much else was left
unanswered in the Upjohn opinion. Although the Court laid to rest the
control group test, its inability to expand the guidelines of application
beyond one narrow area of the law will hamper federal courts and corporate counsel in their efforts to properly fulfill the purposes of the
privilege. By failing to stress the applicability or importance of the
several factors noted in Upjohn to subsequent cases wrestling with the
same issues, the Supreme Court has left the door open for lower courts
to formulate their own tests under different facts. As a result, the
Court has missed an opportunity to eliminate the confusion existing in
the federal courts. By establishing a privilege which is uncertain it has
perhaps created more confusion. Increased litigation will certainly be a
result of an uncertain privilege. The effect of the Upjohn decision on a
corporation's incentive to investigate possible internal wrongdoing remains unclear. A certain privilege can act to increase or stymie the incentive to investigate. Corporate management's confidence that communications made pursuant to an investigation will be kept within the
corporate walls can either spur the initiation of an investigation or provide management with the abusive tools to cover-up wrongdoing.
By rejecting the control group test and strengthening the workproduct doctrine, the Upjohn decision arguably favors privilege rather
than discovery as the means to ensure the administration of justice. At
least with respect to I.R.S. summons enforcement proceedings, the
Court has reversed the roles of privilege and disclosure and tapped the
latter as the exception. Corporations relying on the Upjohn decision
are put on notice that federal courts will at least in part apply the standards of the modified subject matter test in the application of the
privilege between attorney and client. Beyond that, corporations must
rest their decisions on the presumption that, via the Upjohn opinion,
the role of privileges in the corporate context is placed at least on equal
footing with disclosure and that justice is achieved when both are given
equal weight. Consequently, the door has been opened for the potential use of privilege as a sword rather than a shield.
Scott Selbach
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